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Climate Change Refugees in the
Time of Sinking Islands
ABSTRACT

While environmental migration is not a new phenomenon, the
internationalcommunity has been slow to react to a wildly increasing
number of people displaced by climate-relatedfactors. With the current
scenario of sinking islands, rapid urbanization, and drought, the
international community seems to be on the precipice of a massive
humanitariancatastrophe. Even so, lawmakers appear hesitant to fill
in the gaps of existing internationallaw, leaving an entire category of
people vulnerable and unprotected against the effects of climate change.
Privateclimate-governance initiatives can achieve large-scale, prompt,
and efficient solutions to climate-induced migration. While private
governance initiatives lack the breadth and power of international
agreement, they can bypass current government inaction and provide
protection to climate change refugees while international lawmakers
work toward a meaningful response. A private governance solution
requires both companies and individuals to challenge normative views
that only the government can represent the broadestpublic interest and
effectuate real change.
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INTRODUCTION

It is indisputable that we are in the throes of large-scale climate
change.' An astonishing 2 billion people could become displaced from
their homes by the year 2100 due to climate change-related rising
ocean levels. 2 Thousands of others flee their homes in the context of
slow-onset hazards such as droughts. 3 When considering population
size, in Vanuatu and Tuvalu, Cyclone Pam displaced 55 and 25 percent
of the countries' populations, respectively. 4 Antigua and Barbuda had
approximately ninety-seven thousand residents before Hurricane
Irma, most of whom are now living in third-party countries. 5 A CNN
report in mid-September stated that for the first time in three hundred
years, not a single person was living in Barbuda after the hurricane. 6
The island was virtually destroyed and its surviving residents
relocated abroad.7 The term "climate change refugee" is often used in
the media to define a person displaced by disasters like those
mentioned above.8 However, international law does not adequately
address this concept, resulting in a legal vacuum when considering the

1.
See U.N. ADVISORY GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN MOBILITY, HUMAN
MOBLITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNFCCC-PARIs COP-21 (2015),
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/565b2 lbd9/human-mobility-contextclimate-change-unfecc-paris-cop-2 1-recommendations.html
[https://perma.cc/F43HLQDD] (archived Feb. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Advisory Group Recommendations].
2.
Ariel Scotti, Two billion people may become refugees from climate change by
the
end
of
the
century,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(June
27,
2017),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/billion-people-refugees-climate-changearticle-1.3282594 [https://perma.cc/YXV6-3JL6] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
3.
Frequentlyasked questionson climate change and disasterdisplacement, U.N.
HIGH COMM'R
FOR REFUGEES
(Nov.
6,
2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/latest/20 16/11/581f5 2 dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-disasterdisplacement.html [https://perma.cc/3ZK5-4THL] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
4.
Id.
5.
Joe Sterling & Cassandra Santiago, For the first time in 300 years, no one is
living on Barbuda, CNN (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/15/americas/
irma-barbuda-population-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.ccXU2E-NLYC]
(archived
Feb. 11, 2019).
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Scotti, supra note 2.
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protection and recognition of those displaced by climate-related
events.9
Environmental phenomena, compounded by other factors, can
create situations of vulnerability that ultimately result in human
migration. 10 In its first assessment report, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted that the greatest single
impact of climate change may be on human migration." Although this
prediction was made as early as 1990, the international community has
2
been painfully slow to react.1 Both sudden and slow-onset climaterelated events, combined with rapid urbanization, population growth,
and pre-existing social vulnerabilities and poverty, are likely to
3
While the
increase displacement and migration in the future.'
aspects
some
international community has already begun addressing
4
really
to
order
in
of disasters, climate change, and human mobility,1
of the
strands
make progress, it is essential to bring together different
anticipates
also
discourse to develop a comprehensive response that
future challenges associated with climate change.
Part II of this Note discusses the causes, effects, and problems
associated with climate-induced migration, along with the gap in
current international law. Part III addresses the obstacles to a
meaningful resolution, along with the challenges for international law.
Part IV introduces private governance initiatives as an effective
instrument that can be utilized by the international community.

Towards a Protection Agenda for People Displaced Across Borders in the
9.
Context of Disasters and the Effects of Climate Change, THE NANSEN INITIATIVE,
2019)
7,
Mar.
visited
(last
https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/
[https://perma.cc/D6J2-9YUW] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
& ABBIE TAYLOR,
See SUSAN F. MARTIN, SANJULA WEERASINGHE
10.
HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND MIGRATION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES 10

(2014).
11.

J.M. Melillo et al., Effects on Ecosystems, in CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC

SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 283, 298 (1990) ("A major consequence of climate change could

be the migration ... across the landscape.").
See id. at xiii.
12.
See generally Glaucia Boyer & Matthew McKinnon, Development and
13.
Displacement Risks, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 21 (2015) (noting some causes of
climate-induced migration).
See ALEXANDER BETTS, SURVIVAL MIGRATION: FAILED GOVERNANCE AND THE
14.
CRISIS OF DISPLACEMENT 16 (2013).
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BACKGROUND

A. The Relationship between Climate and Human Migration Patterns
1. Understanding Causes of Climate Change Migration
The UN has identified sea level rise, water availability, and
extreme weather events as three of the main climate change issues
that affect migration.' 5 These climate change events can cause a
multitude of both short-term and long-term consequences that may
induce an individual to migrate.1 6 Such consequences include: loss or
reduced habitability of housing; loss of living resources; reduced land
productivity; lack of food, energy, and/or water security; and loss of
social and cultural resources.1 7
a. Sea Level Rise
Sea level rise plays a unique role in the climate change context
because it is both a long-term, gradual process and a contributor to
storm surges and flooding.' 8 Predictions of climate change migration
numbers from coastal regions are often difficult to estimate because
the numbers will depend on the response capacity of communities and
governments through a range of options, such as increased protection
of infrastructure, modification of land use, construction technologies,
and, most pertinent to this Note, planned relocation.' 9
In the case of rising sea level, the number of people forced to move
will depend on adaptation initiatives as well as wider national
planning strategies. 20 For example, sea level rise can result in
degradation such as coastline erosion, which some countries
proactively mitigate through sea walls and other man-made barriers. 21

15.
SUSANA B. ADAMO, INTERACTIVE PANEL IN PREPARATION FOR THE G.A.
SUMMIT To ADDRESS LARGE MOVEMENTS OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS 3 (2016),

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/eventslotherlother/
documents/250416_COLUMBIAUNISusanaAdamo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TMA3LCPT] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
16.
See SUMUDU ATAPATTU, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 156 (2016) ("Migration can be divided into several
categories-temporary, internal, permanent, cross-border or a combination of these
factors.").
17. ADAMO, supra note 15.
18.
Cecilia Tacoli, Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a
Context of High Mobility, 21 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 513, 519 (2009).
19.
Sabine Perch-Nielsen, Understanding the Effect of Climate Change on
Human Migration 10 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished Diploma thesis, Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology Department of Environmental Sciences) (on file with the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology Library system).
20.
Tacoli, supra note 18.
21.
See, e.g., Joey Flechas, Seawall work beginning as king tides arrive in Miami
Beach, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
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Without such planning strategies in place or the resources to execute
22
them, individuals are more at risk of climate-induced migration. One
major obstacle to creating such planning mechanisms, however, is the
difficulty in predicting both the effects of sea level rise and the
phenomenon

23
of sea level rise itself.

For example,

uncertainty

regarding the extent of changes in rainfall patterns and disaster
prediction are serious limitations for any realistic long-term
24
assessment of the link between sea level rise and migration. At the
same time, is it important to understand migration as just one tool in
25
the toolkit that can be used to adapt to sea level rise.
b. Water Availability
Freshwater availability will continually decrease, affecting up to
1 billion people in Asia by 2050.26 The relationship between drought
and cross-border migration is extremely complex and involves analysis
of many factors. In some regions, water availability may only lead to
internal movements.2 7 Even among regions where water availability
may result in cross-border migration, water availability statistics are
often complex and confusing to untangle for lawmakers attempting to
28
address the problem.
Many figures assessing water shortages include in their counts
people living in areas of risk, but not necessarily those directly affected
by water shortages. 2 9 For example, there is case-specific evidence of
countries with plentiful water resources where poor households do not
have adequate access to affordable water, and countries with scarce
water resources where poor households are comparatively well
served.3 0 Furthermore, even if water availability seems like the main
cause of migration, other intersectional concerns may be the driving

community/miami-dade/miami-beachlarticle10212
GE4P] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
See ADAMO, supra note 15.
22.
See Tacoli, supra note 18.
23.

7

2
61 .html

[https://perma.cclX376-

24.

Id.

25.
26.

See id.
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Summary for

/

Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
8
2
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/ 01

02/ar4-wgl-spm-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV2Y-6LZG] (archived Mar. 14, 2019).
See DOUGLAS MASSEY, WILLIAM AXINN & DIRGHA GHIMIRE, ENVIRONMENTAL
27.
CHANGE AND OUT-MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM NEPAL 6 (2007) ("In Nepal, land

degradation and environmental deterioration lead to mainly local movements, although
the better educated tend to move to urban centers further away.").
Tacoli, supra note 18, at 517.
28.
See id.
29.
GORDON McGRANAHAN, DEMAND-SIDE WATER STRATEGIES AND THE URBAN
30.
POOR 4 (2002).
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factor in an individual's choice to migrate. 3 ' Anthropological research
from the late 1990s in northern Mali found that up to 80 percent of
households interviewed had at least one migrant member, but this
high level of mobility was actually related to economic opportunities
and the need to diversify income sources rather than the direct
consequence of desertification. 32
c. Extreme Weather Events
Common extreme weather events include floods, hurricanes, and
landslides. 3 3 These events are well publicized in the mainstream media
because they are sudden and often leave displaced people extremely
vulnerable. 34 One might lose his or her housing due to an extreme
weather event like river or sea flooding or mudslides.35 Migration as a
result of extreme weather events is the easiest type of climate-induced
migration to address, in part because the current legal framework of
the Geneva Convention could theoretically be stretched to include
those displaced by environmental disasters, but also because the link
between extreme weather events and migration is politically palatable
and easier to identify than slow-onset climate events. 36
After an extreme weather event, a large outpouring of climate
change migrants typically occurs, along with a strong call for a political
response to accommodate and provide resources for those affected.3 7
Such an outpouring of migrants can only be limited by responses from
authorities and the general international community.3 8 For example,
after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, out-migration was limited and
mass migration never occurred in part because of the rapid
humanitarian response and the substantial mobilization of nonprofit
groups to support victims at home. 3 9 Alternatively, after the eruption
of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991, many of the displaced
people were still in temporary camps or squatter settlements after
several years. 40 This not only shows the importance of effective coping
strategies by communities and governments, but also highlights the

31.
32.

Tacoli, supra note 18, at 517.
Id.

33.
Id.
34.
SARAH OPITZ STAPLETON ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST. & U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT: THE NEED FOR A RISKINFORMED AND COHERENT APPROACH 9 (2017).
35.
Id. at 17.

36.
37.

Tacoli, supra note 18, at 517.
Perch-Nielsen, supra note 19.

38.
See ASMITA NAIK,
ELCA STIGTER & FRANK LACZKO, MIGRATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL DISASTERS: INSIGHTS FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 8
(2007).

39.
Id.
40.
Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making
Sense of the Debate 3 (U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Working Paper No. 70, 2002).
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overall willingness of the international community to cope with
sudden-onset natural disasters.
Additionally, extreme weather events differ from more complex
slow-onset events because experience shows displaced people often
41
return as soon as possible to reconstruct their homes and livelihoods.
After the Kobe earthquake in Japan in 1995, three hundred thousand
people were displaced, but within three months only fifty thousand had
not returned home. 4 2 Such case studies suggest that international law
needs to account for the different effects of sudden extreme
environmental events and the more gradual consequences of climate
change. Regardless, both scenarios are important for studying how
international law responds to those displaced by environmental
factors.
2. Nonenvironmental Factors as an Intersectional Concern
43
People rarely move solely for environmental reasons; therefore,
it is often difficult to determine the causal link between migration and
environmental triggers. The migratory patterns of those who could be
classified as climate change refugees depend on a combination of
factors at play, such as: individual and household circumstances;
increased population pressures; scarcity of resources; conflicts
associated with scarcity of resources; governance; gender; wealth; and
levels of development. 44 Because these factors are usually closely
intertwined and complex, it can be difficult to isolate climate-specific
45
factors from other challenges. Lawmakers need to acknowledge that
although it is significant, climate change migration is not only caused
by the weather events mentioned above, such as sea level rise
associated with warming temperatures. Rather, overall patterns of
migration linked to climate change may also have a multitude of
46
Lawmakers
factors influencing an individual's decision to move.
therefore are tasked with looking at a broader migration and
47
environmental nexus.
Gender may be an important variable in migration patterns that
is determined by the locally prevailing gender relations and divisions
of labor. For example, in the Sahel, women are less likely than men to

Perch-Nielsen, supra note 19, at 9-13.
41.
Castles, supra note 40.
42.
43.
Id.
Somini Sengupta, Climate Change Is Driving People From Home. So Why
44.
2017),
21,
(Dec.
TIMES
N.Y.
Refugees?,
as
Count
They
Don't
2 2
1/climate/climate-refugees.html
/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/1
[https://perma.cc/SY9B-SX9L] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
Tacoli, supra note 18, at 517.
45.
See NAIK, STIGTER & LACZKO, supra note 38, at 39 ("[Whether or not there is
46.
an increase in migration after a natural disaster depends on a wide variety of factors.").
47.
Id.
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engage in short-term movement, since marriage is their main reason
to move.4 8 In Nepal, where women have primary responsibility for
agricultural production, they are significantly less likely than men to
move to distant destinations. 49
Wealth also plays a role in migration trends.50 Evidence points to
better-educated and more socially connected groups being relatively
unaffected by environmental degradation.5 1 When considering the
spectrum of wealth, however, severely impoverished groups may be
less likely to migrate due to limited capacity to invest in a move, and
reliance on the availability of locally based opportunities to receive
income. 52
Cultural factors can affect migratory patterns as well.53 On many
Pacific Islands, discussed further below in Part II.C, almost all of the
land is owned according to tradition, and acquiring land for
resettlement can be complex. 54 Given such unknowns, many island
nations could struggle with deciding which planning mechanism to
start now to address increasing climate change migration. 5 5 Two
scholars contend that an iconic picture from Tuvalu depicting a victim
wading through floods has become a symbol of a particularly Western:
crisis that fails to take into account the Tuvaluans' own views of.
nature.56 They assert that dominant representations of adaptation to.
climate change that centralize climate refugees are devoid of
appropriate cultural meaning and fail to consider existing resilience,
including traditional migration practices, among the populations
exposed to sea level rise.5 7 This shows that the discourse of climaterefugee protection can unintentionally fail to consider cultural and
political resilience among the population that is in part embedded in
existing practices.5 8 Due to the combined impacts of varying levels of
vulnerability; the environment; and economic, cultural, and political
pressures, it is becoming increasingly difficult to categorize displaced
people and to determine those who are most at risk.

48.
Sally E. Findley, Does DroughtIncrease Migration?A Study of Migrationfrom
Rural Mali during the 1983-1985 Drought, 28 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 539, 539 (1994).
49.
Tacoli, supra note 18, at 517.
50.
Id.
51.
Findley, supra note 48, at 541.
52.
Tacoli, supra note 18, at 518.
53.
Ilan Kelman, Difficult Decisions: Migration from Small Island Developing
States Under Climate Change, 3 EARTH'S FUTURE 133, 134 (2015).
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Carol Farbotko & Heather Lazrus, The First Climate Refugees? Contesting
Global Narrativesof Climate Change in Tuvalu, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 382, 383
(2012).
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
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B. Typology of Climate Migration
1. Migration as a Form of Adaptation
Mobility may best be characterized as a form of adaptation to
climate change.59 A complexity of forces, including social, economic,
and cultural processes, shape this migration. Among these complex
forces, environmental factors are a unique influence that has yet to be
60
analyzed and dealt with effectively. In the past, legal responses have
focused primarily on mitigation and prevention of the effects of climate
change. 6 1 However, as climate change-induced migration continues to
grow, adaptation efforts will play a larger role than mitigation due to
62
a correlated increase in adverse consequences. Therefore, this Note
will focus on adaptation instruments, rather than mitigation efforts.
Even among the varying typology summarized below, climate
change migration can be categorized into two distinct groups: (1)
displacement caused by the sudden onset of climatic disruptions (such
as hurricanes) and (2) displacement caused by the gradual
consequences associated with climate change (such as rising sea
levels). 6 3 While protection of individuals is important in both
situations, the legal questions that arise in conjunction with the
gradual consequences of climate change are much more complex and
will be the main focus of this Note.
Often, the concepts of climate migration seem too broad or vague
to be operational, as they include internal and international migrants,
as well as voluntary and forced migrants who may move either
temporarily or permanently.6 4 While such categorization may result in
an adverse thinning of reality for the individuals affected by climate
change migration, the typology defined below provides a set of
governable categories that can be utilized in international law
instruments.
2. Internally Displaced Peoples and Cross-Border Displacement
The international community has made legal distinctions between
individuals who are internally displaced within their country of origin

ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 157.
59.
Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration:
60.
Implications for International Law, 27 WIs. INT'L L.J. 607, 614 (2009) [hereinafter
Atapattu Human Rights].
See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
61.
Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162; United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and
62.
Challenges for InternationalLaw, 4 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2014) [hereinafter
Atapattu DisappearingStates].
Atapattu Human Rights, supra note 60.
63.
64.

ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 168.
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and those who are displaced across international borders. 6 5 The UN
Guiding. Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding Principles)
define "internally displaced persons" as:
[p]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order
to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations
of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed
an internationally recognized State border. 6 6

This definition clearly encompasses those who flee their homes
due to disasters, but it is unclear whether or not gradual climatic
events-for example, desertification-would meet this definition. 6 7
Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles clearly places the responsibility
of providing protection and humanitarian assistance to internally
displaced people on the shoulders of national authorities. 68
Climate-induced cross-border displacement refers to situations
where people flee or are displaced across international borders in the
context of either sudden or slow-onset disasters, or in the context of the
adverse effects of climate change.6 9 Although much of the discourse,
surrounding climate change refugees considers individuals both
internally displaced and those displaced across international borders,
under the international law addressed in this Note, only individuals
that cross a definitive international border are eligible for legal
protection. 70 While not the primary focus of this Note, understanding
the Guiding Principles is important from a holistic standpoint when
considering climate change refugees.7 1 Further, the Guiding Principles
provide a powerful case study for lawmakers attempting to deal with
cross-border displacement as a result of climate change. 72
3. Voluntary and Forced Migrants, Both Temporary and Permanent
Classifying migration as forced or voluntary can be both
controversial and hard to define.7 3 Normally, however, those migrating
from countries in an early or intermediate stage of environmental
degradation may be more likely to be classified as voluntary

65.

Id.

66.
U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 1 (2004).
67.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 163.
68.
Id.
69.
ADAMO, supra note 15.

70.

See, e.g., Rowena Maguire, Governance of Climate Displacement Within the

UN Climate Regime, in GOVERNING THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: INSTITUTIONAL
INTEGRITY AND INTEGRITY SYSTEMS 118 (2017).

71.
Principles
72.
73.

See ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 168 (commending that the Guiding
squarely place responsibility to the state's authority).
Id.
Atapattu DisappearingStates, supra note 62, at 23.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

738

[VOL. 52:727

'

migrants. 74 In these cases, migration could be characterized as a nearnormal adaptation strategy, which can subsequently be hard to classify
75
as clear "climate change migration" under international law. Even if
migration seems voluntary, when all the circumstances are taken
76
Classifying forced
together, migration can be deemed forced.
imminent or acute
of
migration is normally presented in the context
77
who are forced to
"people
natural disaster. It has been defined as
due to
permanently
or
leave their homes or land either temporarily
or
change
climate
significant environmental damage associated with
78
where their national state is no longer habitable." Climate change
migration is best understood on a continuum, however, because it
ranges from cases of clearly forced migration to clear cases of voluntary
79
migration, with vaguely defined areas in between.
In cases of irreversible environmental degradation, with the most
notable example being rising sea levels of small island countries,
resulting migration can require permanent relocation of affected
80
populations to a third country. In such scenarios, there is currently
no consistent mechanism for making the necessary legal arrangements
for basic services and amenities when an individual transitions from
8
his or her home country to a receiving country.
C. Case Study: Small Island Developing States
The Small Island Developing States (SIDS), sometimes referred to
as "Sinking Islands," are several countries and territories that have
joined together through the United Nations (UN) to tackle many of
their region-specific obstacles, a large one being climate change
migration. 8 2 Most SIDS are situated only about one meter above sea
level and face gradual sea level rise along with extreme weather events
like flooding. 83 SIDS give lawmakers a useful case study due to both
their pressing and apparent environmental concerns, and their
84
particular demographic, cultural, and political circumstances. Due to
the likelihood of complete submergence in the next thirty to fifty years,

Id.
74.
Migration and Climate Change: A Complex Nexus, INT'L ORG. FOR
75.
14, 2019)
(last visited Mar.
https://www.iom.int/complex-nexus
MIGRATION,
[https://perma.cc/H25S-KPB2] (archived Feb. 11, 2019).
Atapattu DisappearingStates, supra note 62, at 23.
76.
Id.
77.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 165.
78.
79.

INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 75.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 165.
Id.
Kelman, supra note 53, at 133.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 222.
Id.
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SIDS present an example of the urgent need for international action
addressing climate change refugees.8 5
Because any solution for climate change refugees must include the
populations of SIDS, the various proposals and decision-making
frameworks analyzed specific to SIDS could be effective tools when
considering the challenges to address. 86 Under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed countries have
pledged to assist SIDS by providing funds for adaptation measures, but
the main issues of the fate of the population and what happens to the
state itself once the territory disappears still remain.8 7 Perhaps
relocation plans should be adopted as adaptation plans under the
UNFCCC, or perhaps such decisions should be left to the individual
citizen.8 8 Once an individual has made the decision to migrate, SIDS
need to decide whether they want to develop a postmigration
community, or focus on integrating their citizens with other
communities.8 9 If integrating entirely with other communities,
individuals are at risk of abandoning their identity, culture, and
language.9 0 This may lead SIDS toward the rebuilding option, which
requires land to be either donated or purchased from another:
location.9 1 Scholars have advanced drastic relocation proposals,
including creating artificial islands for climate change refugees. 9 2 The
question remains, however, of who would pay for construction and
maintenance of the artificial islands or the postmigration
community.93
SIDS present unprecedented obstacles and pose many novel legal
questions. For example, proposals for instruments dealing with climate
change refugees must not only make sure they adequately encompass,
the populations of SIDS, but also should consider the contention that
referring to such people as refugees could be both legally incorrect aswell as unethical. 94 Calling them refugees might not account for their
statelessness, and even the SIDS coalition has recognized that many
islanders accept the likelihood of moving due to climate change, but do
not wish to be labeled as refugees.95 On the other hand, such

85.
Rick Noack, A proposal in New Zealand could trigger the era of 'climate
change refugees,'WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/ 2 017/10/31/a-proposal-in-new-zealand-could-trigger-the-era-of-climatechange-refugees/?utmterm=.e6fae9aabfc2 [https://perma.cc/34W9-666S] (archived Feb.
11, 2019).
86.
Kelman, supra note 53, at 133.
87.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 233.
88.
See id.
89.
Kelman, supra note 53, at 135.
90.
Id.
91.
See ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 238; Kelman, supra note 53, at 136.
92.
Kelman, supra note 53, at 136.
93.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 136.
94.
Id. at 167.
95.
Kelman, supra note 53, at 133.
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under new

D. Governance of Climate Change Refugees and Divisions within the
Global Community
When people migrate across international borders, international
law must govern the legal situation created by that movement. The
current regime does not directly address climate displacement, but
rather it creates a number of obligations that, when read collectively,
96
provide some semblance of protection. The following Part presents
brief summaries of the varying fragmented legal provisions that inform
the framework surrounding climate change refugees.
1. Human Rights Regime
a. 1951 UN Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention) is the main international instrument of refugee
97
law and created the most widely accepted refugee definition to date.
The Refugee Convention defined a refugee as a person who:
Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.9 8

An individual who flees his or her home country due to
environmental reasons will not satisfy the conditions necessary to be

99
considered a refugee under the aforementioned doctrine. While some
regional instruments have expanded their definitions of refugee to
tenuously include those affected by climate change, such expansions
encompass only those who flee their homes as a result of disasters, and
it is questionable whether gradual degradation would meet that
condition.1 00

See infra Part II.D.
96.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
97.
137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
Id.
98.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 168.
99.
22. 1984,
Declaration on Refugees, Nov.
100. See, e.g., Cartagena
https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees
[https://perma.ccIM3GV-J3SGI
-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html
(archived Mar. 14, 2019) (recognizing that because of previous massive refugee flows in
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Individuals who cross an international border but are not fleeing
persecution or natural disaster are considered migrants.10 1 Migration
refers to the movement of people and is a catchall phrase to encompass
everybody who moves from his or her place of origin for varying
reasons.102

b. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) is a UN agency committed to universal ideals of human
dignity and rights.10 3 In October 2017, the OHCHR held a panel
discussion on human rights, climate change, and migrants and persons
displaced across international borders.1 04 The panel called for
cooperation and assistance to address the impacts of climate change,
which included the protection and promotion of human rights of
migrants. 10 5 The OHCHR recognized that there is a need for urgent
action to address migration displacement in the context of climate
change, and noted that impacts combine with individual
vulnerabilities and socioeconomic and political contexts to affect the
ability and agency of potential migrants. 106 The ongoing panel
discussions present opportunities to develop a deeper understanding of
the relationship between climate change and human rights, as well as
present recommendations that could help cross-border migrants.1 0 7
In 1990, the UN appointed a special rapporteur to study the
relationship between human rights and the environment.1 0 8 Felipe
Gonzdlez Morales is the current UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Right of Migrants and Francois Crepeau is the former special.

Central America it is necessary to consider enlarging the concept of refugees to include
"persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom
have been
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflict, massive
violation of human rights, or other circumstances which have seriously disturbedpublic
order") (emphasis added).
101. Atapattu DisappearingStates, supra note 62, at 22.
102. Id.
103. About
Us,
U.N.
HIGH
COMM'R
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2019)
[https://perma.cclUQS7-A9HL] (archived Feb. 13, 2019).
104. IntersessionalPanelDiscussion on Human Rights, Climate Change, Migrants
and Persons Displaced Across International Borders, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/15/Wopi Frame.aspx?sourcedoc=/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ClimateMigrants/ConceptNote.docx&action=default
&DefaultItemOpen=1 [https://perma.cclPW8L-GNJH] (archived Feb. 13, 2019).
105. Id.
106. Benoit Mayer & Christel Cournil, Climate Change, Migration and Human
Rights: Towards Group-Specific Protection?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 173, 175 (2016).

107.
108.

Id.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 53.
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rapporteur. 0 9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) all inform the general human rights protection afforded to
as non-group-specific
refugees by reference
climate change
10
These instruments call for substantive equality, which
instruments.1
requires different treatment for significantly different situations.
While migration itself can be a source of vulnerability, the
vulnerability of migrants does not depend on the cause of migration
under the idea of substantive equality, like it might under the

UNFCCC.111 Specifically, both the UDHR and ICCPR state that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his or her
1 12
own.
c. Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility
The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility
(Advisory Group) is coordinated by the UN and is made up of the
OHCHR, the UN Development Program (UNDP), and other non-UN
partners, such as the International Organization for Migration
3
The Advisory Group's stated purpose is to "mobiliz[e] the
(IOM).11
knowledge and expertise to support the design of effective human
14
The group hopes to
mobility resilience measures to climate change."1
minimize risks of displacement through a rights-based participatory
approach, with the benefits of both poverty and sustainable
5
The most
development objectives through a multitude of actions."
notable of these actions for the purposes of this Note is to "provide
guidance and assistance in planning for and facilitate voluntary
11 6
In
internal and cross-border migration as an adaptation strategy."
its work, the Advisory Group utilizes the phrase "human mobility" as
an umbrella term that encompasses displacement of populations,
migration, and planned relocation.117

109.
FOR

See Special Rapporteuron the Human Rights of Migrants, U.N. HIGH COMM'R

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

https://www.ohchr.org/enlissues/migration/srmigrants/

pages/felipegonzalezmorales.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) [https://perma.cclY87BS43X] (archived Feb. 14, 2019).
110. Mayer & Cournil, supra note 106, at 174.
111. Id. at 175.
112. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(2), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A at 13(2),
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
113. ADVISORY GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN MOBILITY, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND HUMAN MOBILITY SOLUTION AGENDA-RESILIENCE-PARIS COP 21 (2015),

http://www.unhcr.org/uk/557ad0429.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUN4-MD6K] (archived Feb.
14, 2019).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally Advisory Group Recommendations, supra note 1.
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d. UN High Commissioner for Refugees
The mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) is confined to political refugees worldwide as defined by the
Geneva Convention." 8 The UNHCR has consistently maintained that
the group "environmental refugees" is not a legal category and its
mandate does not extend to them." 9 Despite this official stance, the
UNHCR recognizes that there is a fundamental link between
displacement, development, and the environment. In a recent report,
the UNHCR discusses the situation of East African environmental
migrants and climate change.12 0 Although the UNHCR has
maintained the traditional lines between political refugees and climate
change refugees, an increase in displacement could soon blur these
lines as it becomes harder to disentangle the multiple causes for
human movement.
2. Environmental Regime
a. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
The UNFCCC is an international environmental law treaty with
the main objective stated as the "stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."121
Nowhere does the UNFCCC reference climate displacement or
migration, but it does require that:
[t]he specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties,
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would
have to bear disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should
be given full consideration. 12 2

Thus, the UNFCCC concerns state-to-state relations and does not
discuss duties that states have to individuals.1 23 Its adaptation efforts
focus on prevention and mitigation of climate change itself, rather than

118. UNHCR is charged with political refugees under the Geneva Convention on
Refugees. See Refugee Convention, supra note 97, art. 1(A)(2).
119. See Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Statement by Mrs.
Sadako Ogata at the Swiss Peace Foundation (Oct. 30, 1992).
120. Graham Norwood, UNHCR Report on East African Environmental Migrants:
Long on Anecdotes, Short on Data, NEW SEcURITY BEAT (July 6, 2012),
https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/20 1 2 /0 7/unhcr-report-on-east-african-environmentalmigrants-long-on-anecdotes-short-on-data/ [http://perma.cc/8B6Z-9PY9] (archived Feb.
14, 2019).
121. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38 [hereinafter UNFCCC.
122. Id. art. 3(2).
123. See id. arts. 3-4.
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24
focusing on those who cross borders due to climate change's effects.1
Despite some of its shortcomings, the UNFCCC still provides a valid
avenue to deal with climate change refugees; a number of helpful
frameworks have subsequently been created under the UNFCCC,
including the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with
125
Climate Change Impacts (Warsaw Mechanism).

a. Cancun Adaptation Framework, 2010
The Cancun Adaptation Framework invites parties to take further
action on "measures to enhance understanding, coordination and
cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement,
migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national,
126
Paragraph 14(f) recognizes that
regional and international levels."
border, thus providing some
cross
or
internal
be
may
displacement
to assist those who
responsibility
institutional
international
of
form
12 7
have to flee from their country of origin.
Not only was the Cancun Adaptation Framework the first
instance in which the UN recognized climate change refugees, but it
also laid the foundation for developing a loss-and-damage mechanism
by requiring parties to enhance climate change-related disaster riskreduction strategies, including early warning systems, risk assessment
and management, and transfer mechanisms such as insurance at local,
28
national, and regional levels.1
b. Warsaw Mechanism, 2013
The Warsaw Mechanism was created specifically for people
29
displaced by climate change.1 It seeks to address the losses and
damages that arise from climate change and focuses on institutional
30
development, information gathering, and capacity building.
Specifically, paragraph 5(c) creates authority for the legal regime to
provide technical support and to facilitate the mobilization and

/

124. See id.
125. Mayer & Cournil, supra note 106, at 185.
FOR
126. See Migration, Displacement and PlannedRelocation, U.N. HIGH2 COMM'R
2
REFUGEES (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.unher.org/en-us/news/editorial/201 /1
55535d6a9/migration-displacement-planned-relocation.html#_ednref1 1
[https://perma.cc/8NLQ-Y6XD] (archived Mar. 10, 2019).
127. Id.
128. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Partieson its Sixteenth Session, held in Cancun from 29 November to
10 December 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011).
129. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its Nineteenth Session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23
November 2013, 6-9, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2014).
130. Id.
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securing of expertise, including finance, technology, and capacity
building. 13' Furthermore, the specific mention of slow-onset events
means that damage associated with sea level rise, such as
displacement, is covered by the Warsaw Mechanism.1 32 Although the
framework is only beginning to emerge, it is establishing processes and
structures needed to start exploring how to govern climate
displacement.
c. Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement is an agreement within the UNFCCC with
the purpose of strengthening the ability of countries to deal with the
impacts of climate change.' 33 Although the Paris Agreement does not
directly address climate change displacement, it provides protections
that are essential to people adapting to climate change by migrating.1 34
The preamble recognizes that climate change is a common concern of
humankind and includes a reference to migrants, asking parties to
respond, promote, and consider their respective obligations toward
migrants when taking actions to address climate change.13 5 It also
contains references to the protection of people, the resilience of
communities, and the importance of livelihoods.' 3 6 These references
allow parties to address displacement resulting from various climate.
issues and the need for livelihood opportunities to enable people to
remain where they live.' 3 7 Article 8 explicitly requests the executive
committee of the Warsaw Mechanism to establish a task force on
displacement.1 3 8 This task force will "develop recommendations for
integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement
related to the adverse impacts of climate change."1 39 Such a task force
suggests acknowledgment of the dangers of displacement and
recognition of climate change as a factor of displacement. In spite of
political controversy and criticism, the Paris Agreement remains as an
instrument for framing human rights and vulnerability among the

131.
132.

Maguire, supra note 70, at 126.
Id.

133.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the

Conference of the Partieson its Twenty-First Session, held in Parisfrom 30 November to
13 December 2015, 1-2, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris
Agreement Report].

134. Maguire, supra note 70, at 128.
135. ParisAgreement Report, supra note 133, at 1-2.
136. Id.
137. Elizabeth Ferris, Brookings Institution, Climate Change, Migration and the
Incredibly Complicated Task of Influencing Policy, Keynote Presentation at Conference
on Human Migration and the Environment: Future, Politics, Invention 6 (July 1, 2015),
http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/FERRIS- 1-JULY-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AML-UD89] (archived Mar. 10, 2019).
138. ParisAgreement Report, supra note 133, at 12-13.
139. Id.
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international community, albeit
140
supporters initially hoped.

potentially

less
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effective

than

d. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
The IPCC is the international body tasked with assessing the
14
science related to climate change. 1 It recognized as early as 1990 that
human migration could be the greatest single impact of climate
change.1 4 2 JPCC provides scientific assessments of climate-related
43
policies, which are in turn used by the UNFCCC.s The IPCC is open
to all member countries of the World Meteorological Organization and
44
the UN and currently has 195 members.1
3. Other Notable Developments
The lack of a clear international legal framework to respond to
people displaced by climate change has resulted in calls to protect
45
which have manifested themselves in
climate change refugees,1
developments outside of the human rights and environmental regimes.
a. The Nansen Initiative
The Nansen Initiative grew out of the Nansen Conference
organized by the Norwegian government in 2011 and has focused on
46
The Norwegian and Swiss
cross-border disaster displacement.1
governments set up a small consulting committee that met with
47
governments and regional officials.1 The Nansen Initiative did not
come up with a set of definitive guidelines, but rather hopes to build
48
Switzerland and
consensus around regional protection efforts.'
Norway guide the work and act as chairs for the steering group, and
are joined by Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Kenya,
49
Mexico, and the Philippines.1
140. Johannes Urpelainen, Trump's withdrawalfrom the ParisAgreement means
POST (Nov. 21, 2017),
other countries will spend less to fight climate change, WASH.
17
/11/21/trumpshttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/20
noncooperation-threatens-climate-finance-under-the-paris-agreement/?utm-term=
.043da4a74fb8 [https://perma.cc/48G2-A3LE] (archived Feb. 15, 2019).
141.

See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC2 FACT

147.

Id.

/

8
2
SHEET: WHAT IS THE IPCC? (2013), https://www.ipcc.chlsite/assets/uploads/ 01 /0
IPCC].
[hereinafter
2019)
18,
[https://perma.cc/2KHZ-RT6R] (archived Mar.
142. Atapattu DisappearingStates, supra note 62, at 3.
143. See, e.g., id.
144. IPCC, supra note 141.
145. See, e.g., Sengupta, supra note 44.
146. Ferris, supra note 137, at 7-8.

148. Id. at 8 (explaining that the protection agenda attempts to address the
highest areas of need).
149.

Id.
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The work is state-led, which means that governments' views are
incorporated each step of the way.15 0 The Nansen Initiative has been
successful in part because it recognizes the need to look at issues
related to climate change migration, such as addressing regular
migration, internal displacement, and the acknowledgement of a
diverse set of fields, including humanitarian action, human rights
protection, disaster risk reduction, and refugee protection and
development.1 5 1 Another source of the Nansen Initiative's success is its
focus on concrete tools such as humanitarian visas, stays of
deportation, and bilateral or regional arrangements on free movement
of persons. 152
The Nansen Initiative accounts for political obstacles by not
suggesting the creation of a new international law; rather, it focuses
on common understandings of the issues and reiterates key principles
and recommendations. 15 3 The key value of the Nansen Initiative lies
in the extent to which governments use the recommendations and the
extent to which they are incorporated into national laws and
policies.1 54 Due to the Nansen Initiative, we now know a lot more about
the impacts of disasters and climate change on displacement, and have,
identified practices to prevent, prepare for, and respond to such
challenges, such as when people are forced to flee across international
borders.1 5 5 Potential areas of future action have been compiled in an
official "Protection Agenda" on cross-border displacement in the
context of disaster and were discussed during a global
intergovernmental consultation in Geneva in October 2015.156 The
Nansen Initiative emphasizes the need for a "toolbox" of policy options
that go beyond protecting the displaced and that address other forms
of human mobility, including when people are displaced across borders
in regular or planned ways.15 7 For example, ensuring that existinglegal and policy frameworks for internally displaced persons are fully
implemented was identified as a way to improve the overall response
to disaster-related displacement.1 58

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Borge Brende & Didier Burkhalter, Foreword, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 4,
4 (2015).
157. Walter Kalin, The Nansen Initiative: Building Consensus on Displacement in
Disaster Contexts, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 5, 6 (2015).
158. Id.
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b. International Organization for Migration
The IOM is the leading international organization for migration
that acts with partners in the international community to advance
understanding of migration issues and encourage social and economic
159
While the IOM works to assist
development through migration.
states in the development and delivery of programs, it has no legal
protection mandate and primarily serves to promote human rights
through coordinated responses. 160 The IOM's most notable partnership
includes the Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance
1
(CCEMA).1 6
While the IOM collects data, there are few reliable concrete
figures on the number of people who have migrated as a result of
62
climate change or on projected future climate-migration figures.1
This is because precise figures are difficult to generate, as the numbers
will depend on the climate change scenarios that play out, the
adaptation activities that are implemented, and the evolution of
various socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors influencing
decisions to migrate.1 63
c. New Zealand Proposal
On October 24, 2017, a New Zealand government minister
indicated that New Zealand could become the world's first country to
essentially recognize climate change as an official reason to seek
1 64
Under the government's campaign,
asylum or residence elsewhere.
up to one hundred individuals per year could be admitted on a newly
created visa category. 16 5 Despite zealous efforts by individuals and
organizations, none of the aforementioned regimes have provided
166
clear-cut rights or aid to those affected by environmental disruption.

159.

Mission, INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/mission (last visited

Feb. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/EE5B-4WJE] (archived Feb. 17, 2019).
160. Id.
FOR MIGRATION,
Climate Change, INT'L ORG.
161. Migration and
(last visited Feb. 24, 2019)
https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0
[https://perma.cc/Z9F9-39P6](archived Feb. 17, 2019).
162. Maguire, supra note 70, at 119.
163. Id.
164. Noack, supranote 85.
165. Id.
166. See infra Part III.B.
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ANALYSIS

A. Obstacles to a Meaningful Resolution
1. Violence as a Collateral Impact of Climate Change Migration
The link between environmental issues-in particular resource
scarcity-and conflict has long been recognized,16 7 but climate change
has added an additional layer of complexity to the problem.1 6 8 One
group of scholars has developed a useful typology on the subject, in
which environmental change could lead to overuse of, and increased
competition for, goods and services, housing, food, and jobs, which
could lead to conflict.' 6 9 On the other hand, conflict can lead to resource
scarcity, creating a sort of "feedback loop" that can be hard to follow.1 70
The US military is likewise concerned about climate change
refugees.171 A 2011 National Academies study commissioned by the
U.S.
Navy
discussed
the
various
threats
and
political
destabilization that an influx of climate refugees in certain nations
would cause, noting that climate change-induced migration could:
increase the possibility of political conflict and violence.1 72 The same
report also expressed concerns about US military resources being
stretched thin for climate-related natural-disaster relief. 7 3
Slow-onset environmental changes
are more likely to
disproportionately affect politically and economically marginalized
groups.1 74 Traditionally, pastoralists have developed well-equipped,
strategies to cope with unpredictable environments, including seasonal
movement to markets. 7 5 However, decreased rainfall and increased
drought could put more pressure on pastoral resources, pushing them
further away from their traditional migratory routes.' 7 6 This could
increase conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers
over dwindling resources.1 77 The conflict in Darfur is attributed in part
to this phenomenon, where conflict ensued after a combination of
environmental pressures and the breakdown of traditional social

167. See, e.g., Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent
Conflict: Evidence from Cases, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5, 7-8 (1994).
168. ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 243-44.
169. 01i Brown, Anne Hammill & Robert McLeman, Climate Change as the 'New'
Security Threat: Implications for Africa, 83 INT'LAFF. 1141, 1148 (2007).
170. Id. at 1150.
171.

See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES (2011).
172. See generally id.
173. See generally id.
174. Tacoli, supra note 18, at 518.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.

750

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1
structures and migratory routes.
in part to climate change:

78

[vot. 52:727

The Arab Spring is also attributed

To be sure, longstanding economic and social distress and lack of opportunity for
so many Arab youth in the Middle East and across North Africa only needed a
spark to ignite resolutions across the region. But environmental degradation and
the movement of people from rural areas to already overcrowded cities alongside
rising food prices enabled the cumulative effects of long-term economic and
1 79
political failures to sweep across borders with remarkable agility.

Furthermore, there is an active debate as to whether climatic
conditions have contributed to unrest in other war-torn countries like
Syria.18 0 The unrest in Syria was preceded by a drought that led to
lower crop yields and migration to urban areas, and although the
drought was likely not a main trigger of the Syrian conflict, it could
18 1
These examples
have added an additional stressor to the region.
show that climate change migration might pose a threat to human
82
security even when it is not the main cause of conflict.1
Some scholars critique the causal link between climate change
183
Much of the
and conflict, noting their skepticism of such assertions.
rhetoric on climate change migration depicts threats from masses of
184
Critics of such a rhetoric
poor individuals fleeing a bad environment.
argue that it plays into the hands of those who wish to securitize and
1 85
In the context of Darfur, one
militarize the topic of migration.
scholar challenged the notion of climate change migration as a cause
of violence by saying that "attempts to paint the Darfur conflict as
simply resource-based 'whitewashed the Sudan government' because
the war was caused by the Government's response to the rebellion not
1 86
Nonetheless, migration is a factor the UN
by conflict over resources."
Security Council regularly uses to determine whether a situation
87
Legal
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.'
instruments addressing climate change refugees must consider not
only the rights and well-being of those displaced, but also possible

178. Scott Edwards, Social Breakdown in Darfur, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 23,
23 (2008).
179. ATAPATIU, supra note 16.
180. See, e.g., Anouch Missirian & Wolfram Schlenker, Asylum Application
Respond to Temperature Fluctuations, Sc. MAG., Dec. 22, 2017, at 1610.
181. Id. ("Mhe unrest in Syria was preceded by a record drought that led to lower
agricultural yields and forced farmers to migrate to urban areas.").
182. ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 249.
183. Id. at 252.
184. See Giovanni Bettini, Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A Critique of
Apocalyptic Narratives on 'Climate Refugees,' 45 GEOFORUM 63, 63-68 (2013); Calum
T.M. Nicholson, Climate Change and the Politics of Causal Reasoning: The Case of
Climate Change and Migration, 180 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 151, 152 (2014).
185. Bettini, supra note 184, at 68.
186. Sunga, supra note 179, at 81.
187. Id.
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security implications of climate change. It is necessary to put in place

mechanisms that will mitigate potential threats to international peace
and security and avoid an "'unholy brew' that could create dangerous
security vacuums," a fear that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
voiced in the UN Security Council's 2011 statement on possible
security implications of climate change.18 8
2. Political Barriers
The idea of expanding international law to encompass climate
change refugees or creating a new treaty entirely has been rejected in
the past.18 9 This is partly due to fear of undermining the fragile
achievements realized thus far in protecting both refugees and those
displaced by climate change, but also because it is difficult to
accumulate the political will necessary to make such a radical
change.1 90
a. Lack of Political Will
Some states seem to lack the political will to negotiate a universal,
treaty or other legal instruments. Despite much scholarly discussion
on the topic of climate change refugees and SIDS, protection for
climate-induced migrants does not seem forthcoming. 1 9 ' Many forces
are working together, causing protection efforts to go unfulfilled.
One explanation is that states that are part of the Geneva.
Convention already have legal obligations to refugees and may not be
willing to commit to protecting additional people displaced by climate
change.' 9 2 Additionally, these states have obligations focused on
mitigating climate change, and may not feel ready to take on additional.
responsibility.1 9 3 For states that are not substantially affected by the
issue, the severity of the problem may not have sunk in.1 94
From a more cynical standpoint, Sumudu Atapattu' 9 5 believes
that even after bold speeches and elaborate commitments,

188. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council, in Statement, Says
"Contextual Information" on Possible Security Implications of Climate Change
Important When Climate Impacts Drive Conflict, U.N. Press Release SC/10332 (July 20,
2011).
189. Mayer & Cournil, supra note 106, at 1.
190. Id. at 1-2.
191. ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 158.
192. Jane McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change
Displacement Treaty Is Not the Answer, 23 INVL J. REFUGEE L. 2, 2-6 (2011).
193. ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 159.
194. Id.
195. See id. at xix (acknowledging that Atapattu, a professor of law, serves as the
Lead Counsel for Human Rights at the Center for International Sustainable
Development Law and is on the advisory board of the McGill InternationalJournalof
SustainableDevelopment Law and Policy).
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'

"environmental protection and sustainable development typically fall
prey to narrow geo-political interests when the time for action
comes."1 96 Under this rationale, the issues that are solved become what
policy makers pay attention to, and the scale of the problem is
97
On a similar note, urgent issues that get
collectively ignored.'
sensationalized in the media might receive a stronger and swifter
198
Therefore, legal instruments would be
reaction from lawmakers.
more concerned with a violent event that displaces four hundred
thousand people as opposed to slow encroaching sea level rise that
99
Dissenters would argue that this viewpoint is
displaces 4 million.1
inaccurate and that politicians would not neglect such issues, but such
2 00
Regardless of whether
a stance potentially ignores political reality.
there has been a deliberate attempt to ignore climate change migration
or not, forced climate migrants have consistently fallen through the
20
cracks of international refugee and immigration policy.
b. Fear of Regression
Climate change-refugee advocates fear that if negotiations were
opened, lawmakers or politicians may try to weaken the protections
20 2
Such concern stems in part from the policies of
that already exist.
the Trump administration, which have prevented Syrian and Yemeni
20 3
Small and mundane
refugees from coming into the country.
climate change
makes
that
treaty
a
to
lead
could
disagreements
204
Furthermore, such a
refugees worse off than existing policies.
regression could not only hurt those displaced by climate change, but
could also affect other refugees, including those who are forced to leave
20 5
Even if
their communities due to war or fear of persecution.
legislators could accurately define climate change refugees, they run
the risk of privileging climate change refugees by prioritizing them
206
A legal category for climate change refugees
over other refugees.
resources from the many obligations
current
divert
only
not
could
states have toward traditional political refugees, but mass migration
could also increase alarm and xenophobia directed toward all refugees,
regardless of whether the source of their status originates from politics
207
Such alarmist talk could foster resentment and
or climate change.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 159.
Id.
Sengupta, supra note 44.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 159.
Id.
Id.
Sengupta, supra note 44.
Id.
Ferris, supra note 137, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id.
Mayer & Cournil, supra note 106, at 11-12.
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prevent the successful integration of all refugees into the
community. 208 On the other hand, protection of climate change
refugees could trigger movement toward more systemic protection of
all refugees, and at the very least it could spark renewed political
debates on the subject that serve as a first step toward broader
perspectives about the rights of refugees. 20 9
As previously mentioned in this Note, the wide variety of policies
relating to climate change and migration present a unique problem in
that they are often discussed in different arenas. Conceptually,
however, these areas are all linked because migration can be a
response to climate change, which is subsequently dealt with by
humanitarian actors. 210 Despite this, the existence of multiple policy
arenas is an obstacle to joint work, in that individuals of different
disciplinary backgrounds may have different priorities and might
disagree on issues that ultimately hurt, rather than help, those in need
of protection. 211
c. Asylum Applications
In 2006, an Australian political party proposed the possibility of
amending the law to include a right to environmental asylum.2 12 Using
asylum applications as a measure to understand the political
implications of a climate change-refugee instrument is significant
because it explores migration patterns that are linked to distress as
already defined by the international community.2 1 3 Such a
phenomenon requires a political response and provides insight into
how regional institutions can respond to climate change refugees. A
study conducted by Anouch Missirian and Wolfram Schlenker from
December 2017 looked at weather patterns in relation to asylum
applicants between 2000 and 2014.214 It suggested that there is a
strong nonlinear relationship between agricultural yields and
temperature, which then affects asylum applications. 215 Over the
growing season, both hot and cold temperatures can reduce yields, and
such an effect can correlate with both potential aggressive behavior

208. Id.
209. See id. (stating that broader perspective would protect without attempting to
draw a line between migrants "deserving" or "undeserving" of specific protection).
210. Ferris, supra note 137, at 5.
211. Id. at 5-7.
212. Press Release, Anthony Albanese & Bob Sercombe, Labor Calls for
International Coalition to Accept Climate Change Refugees (Oct. 9, 2006) (on file with
author).

213.
to focus on
scale).
214.
215.

See Missirian & Schlenker, supra note 180, at 1 (noting that this is the first
distress-driven migration-as measured by asylum applications-on a global
Id.
Id. at 3 ("The change in the volume of applications is highly nonlinear.").
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2 16
While this
leading to conflict and an increase in asylum applications.
speaks to those who worry about increased violence as a result of
climate change, it also shows that instability from suboptimal weather
does not always result in violence, but could instead result in other
217
Despite data showing the
action such as asylum applications.
relationship between the environment and asylum applications, states
would probably hesitate to grant asylum on direct environmental
grounds and have been reluctant to respect the right of asylum even in

situations of persecution.

2 18

3. Analyzing the Scope of the Problems
Another difficulty with climate change migration is researchers'
inability to estimate how many people could migrate due to the
changing climate. In 2007, the nongovernmental organization
Christian Aid reported that 1 billion people would be displaced by
climate change by 2050.219 The UNDP's 2008 Human Development
Report stated that global temperature rises could result in 330 million
220
Generally,
people becoming permanently or temporarily displaced.
estimates of the number of people who will flee their homes because of
climate change range from 50 million to 2 billion persons before
2100.221 Lawmakers cite such uncertainty as a rationale to avoid
expending too many resources in the event that migration does not
2 22
manifest in the way that is currently predicted.
In comparison to the large numbers of those predicted to be
displaced by climate change, in 2006 the UNHCR reported that
globally there were fewer than 10 million refugees as defined by the
223
Clearly then, regardless of the exact figure of
Geneva Convention.
those who will ultimately be displaced by climate change, such
displacement is a problem of great magnitude, and should be
approached with urgency.

216. Id. at 1 ("Hotter-than-usual temperatures can reduce asylum applications for
cold countries and increase them for hot countries.").
217. Id. at 3.
218. See Mayer & Cournil, supra note 106, at 4 (questioning whether states would
be willing to recognize the right to asylum on environmental grounds).
219. Ferris, supra note 137, at 4.
220. U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting
(2007),
9
World
Divided
a
in
Solidarity
Human
Change:
Climate
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en complete.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/E6Q2-8DQ9](archived Mar. 10, 2019).
221. STAPLETON, supra note 34, at 10.
222. Kelman, supranote 53, at 134.
223. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, 2006 GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES,
ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PERSON 5

(2007), https://www.unher.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2JCZ-7J8X] (archived Mar. 10, 2019).
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B. Challenges for InternationalLaw
1. Reconciling Separate Legal Regimes
One of the main reasons why there is no established framework
addressing climate refugees in international law is because no one
could have imagined this situation a few decades ago. Consequently,
environmental protection and human rights evolved as two separate
legal regimes, and policy makers are now confronted with complex
issues in which they must find a way to reconcile intersectional
concerns, such as climate-induced migration, with the existence of
multiple legal frameworks. 2 24 Despite the abundance of literature and
research on climate change migration,22 5 scholars and lawmakers are
becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack of meaningful
resolution under the environmental regime, 22 6 and are turning to the
application of the human rights-climate change framework. 2 27
The existence of separate legal regimes is unwieldy, impractical,
and costly, and it may make more sense to protect affected people
within the legal framework governing either environment or human

rights, but not both. 22 8 Atapattu recognizes the main advantage of

adopting a human rights approach for climate-related issues-the
possibility for victims to seek a remedy and giving a human face to the
problem, rather than focusing attention on the environment, which she
characterizes as an "abstract entity."2 29 Some scholars point to other
rationales for the application of human rights law, including the
contentions that: (1) climate change will result in infringements of
human rights, so it makes normative sense to consider climate change
via a human rights framework; (2) human rights law provides a
framework in which tribunals have a history of balancing human needs
with limited government resources; (3) the human rights framework
already includes tools for monitoring and enforcement; and (4) human

224.

See ATAPAT'TU, supra note 16, at 49 (noting that the historical focus of the

environmental regime was prevention).

225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock,
40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 218 (2016) ("Despite the optimism that emerged from the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, almost a quarter century later the
federal legislative process and international climate negotiations are years from a
comprehensive response.").

227. See, e.g., Margaux Hall & David Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid:
Climate Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 309, 341 (2012)
(purporting that analyzing climate change through a human rights lens is appropriate
despite its problems because climate change is urgent and spells human catastrophe).
228. See ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 49-50 ("[E]nvironmental issues do not fit
neatly within the existing generations of rights.").
229. Id.
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rights law could encourage coherence in adaptation policy, or
230
international standards for adaptation practices at multiple levels.
While there surely are advantages to such an approach, applying
a human-rights framework to climate change refugees could
eventually lead to harm that outweighs the purported benefits. First,
it would lead to a hardening of the framework to a degree where it
could no longer encompass the "pure" environmental issues that
23 1
Second, substantive and
intersect with climate change migration.
could render such
treaties
rights
human
in
procedural weaknesses
2 32
Third, the
refugees.
change
climate
to
ineffective
instruments
rights
human
of
mechanisms
enforcement
and
purported monitoring
233
if
"even
Finally,
process.
the
of
stages
all
law seem to fail at
rights
human
existing
established,
be
could
responsibility and harm
law is concerned primarily with how a government treats its own
citizens and others living within its territory and under its
jurisdiction."2 3 4 Although the UN envisioned such a problem and
therefore imposed a duty to cooperate among state parties in the UN
Charter, this obligation is not necessarily a forceful basis to compel
actions from a state when the very nature of human rights law presents
235
Despite the problems of
tensions that will be difficult to resolve.
issues, scenarios
environmental
to
applying a human rights framework
the social and
which
in
era
a
new
present
of changing circumstances
of separately
thought
be
longer
no
can
political organizations of Earth
must also
law
international
that
a
phenomenon
from Earth itself,
2 36
reflect.

230. Hall & Weiss, supra note 227, at 341. Margaux Hall is a consultant for the
World Bank Legal Vice Presidency and David Weiss is an associate at Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, who has focused on environmental policy in years of work
on Capitol Hill.
231. See generally, e.g., Francois Gemenne & Pauline Brucker, From the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement to the Nansen Initiative: What the Governance of
Environmental Migration Can Learn from the Governance of Internal Displacement, 27

INT'L. J. REFUGEE L. 245 (2015).
232. See Anne F. Bayesfsky, Report on the UN Human Rights Treaties:Facingthe
Implementation Crisis, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 189, 191 (1996) (explaining
that most international treaties contain limitation clauses that allow governments to
avoid granting rights on a national security or public order basis).
233. See Hall & Weiss, supra note 227, at 342 ("An estimated forty-five to eighty
percent of state parties to six UN treaties have overdue reports, with approximately sixty
percent of states parties to six UN treaties having five or more overdue reports.").
234. Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for
PoliticalAction, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 458 (2009).
235. See U.N. Charter arts. 55-56. Article 55 requires members to cooperate in the
promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all." Article 56 requires members' "joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id.
236. Gemenne & Brucker, supra note 231, at 1.
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2. Problematizing the Use of Inconsistent Terminology
A difficult challenge in the area of climate change migration has
been devising a name to describe this category of people, let alone a
definition. 237 Establishing a proper name for those displaced by climate
change is important because whatever name is adopted will have "real
implications for the obligations of the international community under
international law."2 3 8 Various terminologies have been proposed by

scholars, lawmakers, and other actors, but none of the terms are
considered legally binding under international law. 2 39
The concept of "environmental refugees" emerged in the 1970s in
parallel with environmental crises, particularly desertification in
Africa. 240 The term itself was coined by El-Hinnawi in 1995 as "those
who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or
permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption that
jeopardizes their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of
life." 24 1 In a 2007 UN University report, Fabrice Renaud and his

coauthors articulated three categories: "environmentally motivated
migrants," who "'may leave' a steadily deteriorating environment";
"environmentally forced migrants," who "'have to leave' in order to
avoid the worst"; and "environmental refugees," who "flee the worst,'
including natural disasters. 242
The UNHCR has chosen to adopt the term "environmentally
displaced persons" and categorically distinguishes between refugees
and environmentally displaced persons because using the term
environmental refugee to refer to all people forced to migrate because
of climate "loses the distinctive need of refugees for protection." 243 It
blurs the respective responsibilities of national governments toward
their citizens and of the international community toward those who are
without protection. 24 4 The UNHCR goes on to call the term
"environmental refugee" a misnomer. 245

237. ATAPAITU, supra note 16, at 162.
238. Id. at 162 (quoting Oli Brown, Climate Change and Forced Migration:
Observations, Projections and Implications, Human Development Office Occasional
Paper (2007)).
239. Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration: Governance
Challenges, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 402, 410 (2010).
240. Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 56, at 384.
241. Atapattu DisappearingStates, supra note 62, at 29.
242. See generally Fabrice Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face
EnvironmentalMigration?, 5 INTERSECTIONS 29 (2007).
243. CAMILLO BOANO ET AL., REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., ENVIRONMENTALLY
DISPLACED PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE, LIVELIHOODS AND FORCED MIGRATION, FORCED MIGRATION POLICY BRIEFING

24 (2008), https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/pbl-environmentally-displaced-people2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/G866-KFBK] (archived Mar. 10, 2019).
244.
245.

Id.
Id. at 7-8.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

758

[VOL. 52:727

Crepeau prefers the term "climate-change-induced migrant" to
refer to people who may migrate because of the environmental impacts
of climate change. 24 6 Atapattu adopts the term "forced climate
migrants," contending that it captures the essence of migration
24 7
Crepeau and Atapattu choose to
associated with climate change.
forgo the "refugee" label because it might be something the victims do
not want, and a less politically charged term could ultimately lead to
more effective protections by "de-victimizing" migrants and reframing
248
Atapattu makes a
their decision to migrate as an adaptation tool.
strong argument that constantly changing terminology may imply that
climate migration is a very political matter, rather than an
249
Other scholars, like
environmental and human rights concern.
Francois Gemenne, believe that attempts to replace the term "climate
change refugees" with something more clinical such as "climatechange-induced migrants" and "forced climate migrants" could have
negative effects because forgoing the term "climate change refugee" is
in a way also forgoing the idea that climate change is a form of
2 50
He believes such clinical terms
persecution against the vulnerable.
allow "policies [to] take over politics" where lawmakers stress the
25
agency of migrants, yet forget their responsibilities to them. 1
While none of these terms are perfect, adopting a consistent term
will lead to the acknowledgement that this category of people needs
252
Choosing a universal term will at the
recognition and protection.
very least end the debate about appropriate terms, upon which
lawmakers can continue to move forward and address other challenges
facing climate refugees.
3. Problems with Expanding the Current Legal Framework of the
Geneva Convention
Those who advocate for expanding the Geneva Convention must
determine whether the existing framework can be stretched to cover
another category of people unrelated to the original objective and in a
3
totally different context.2 5 While theoretically lawmakers could
expand the definition of a refugee to include "people fleeing a conflict
situation exacerbated by climate change," in order to satisfy the
grounds enumerated in the Geneva Convention, it is not the best
solution. 254 Such an expansion constitutes the exception rather than

246.
247.
248.
249.

ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 165.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id.

250.
251.

Gemenne & Brucker, supra note 231, at 2.
Id.

252.

ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 165.

253.
254.

Atapattu DisappearingStates, supra note 62, at 26.
ATAPATTU, supra note 16, at 168.
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the rule and the individual would still need to seek asylum in the
country he or she hopes to enter.255 The threshold would be very high
and the number of people who could receive such protection under the
Geneva Convention would be very low, making this a solution that does
not adequately deal with the severity of climate change migration. 25 6
Furthermore, substantial differences between environmental migrants
and political refugees as defined by the Geneva Convention do not seem
to allow such an expansion. 257
4. Problems with a Universal Treaty

'

While a universal treaty seems to be the most commonly posed
solution to the climate change-refugee crisis, many potential problems
arise with such a proposal. 25 8 Because climate change migration is
such a complex issue, creating a "fix-all" instrument may have a de
minimis effect on actually solving the issue at hand. 259 A draft
convention means focusing on defining who is "within" or "outside" the
scope of application, which could encourage inaction on climate change,
since the outcome of the treaty could likely be a considerable
compromise given that consensus is required. 260 The notion is
attractive, however, because it seems more manageable than other
proposals. 26
Furthermore, even if a treaty text could be agreed upon, its
ratification, implementation, and enforcement might face political
obstacles. 2 62 In the unlikely event that a treaty is adopted, it could take
years before such an instrument becomes operational. 2 63 Lawmakers
would also need to devise a strategy regarding what to do with
initiatives within existing international structures.264 For example,
policy initiatives with an active dissemination strategy, like the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, mentioned previously in
this Note, were developed by an expert group of international lawyers
and have served as a useful tool. 2 65 This shows that even if a treaty
was reached, there would still be issues in actually solving the problem.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Mayer & Cournil, supra note 106, at 179-80.
258. McAdam, supra note 192, at 17.
259. See id. (arguing that a treaty per se does not solve the problem).
260. See, e.g., Michael Prieur, Draft Convention on the International Status of
Environmentally-DisplacedPersons, 42 URB. LAW. 247, 251-53 (2010) (failing to identify
any applicable accountability or enforcement mechanism).
261. McAdam, supra note 192, at 17.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 16 (explaining states have huge incentives to ratify treaties or other
international initiatives because it would allow shared responsibility among several

countries).

265.

Gemenne & Brucker, supra note 231, at 2.
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While there would surely be benefits to creating a treaty, key
challenges would remain.26 6 Benefits must be weighed with the risk
that legally defining a "climate refugee" category may lead to a
2 67
hardening of the concept, simultaneously defining in and out groups.
5. Problems with Soft Law Solutions
Another practical solution that has been proffered is to adopt a set
26 8
"Soft law," or
of guiding principles or other soft law instruments.
nonbinding law, has played a significant role in some fields of
international law and offers a number of advantages particularly well
2 69
it
suited to the characteristics of climate change refugees.
encompasses a range of nontreaty agreements, including UN
270
declarations and guidance developed by experts.
These instruments would serve as a more immediate solution that
27 1
Soft law
could establish the foundation for a convention later on.
would result in minimal disruption to the communities that have to be
uprooted, the communities that will be receiving climate refugees, and
27 2
With these instruments, the international
the legal system itself.

community could take steps to foster adaptability programs to help
people become more resilient, so they can change livelihoods and stay
27 3
For example, in Climate Refugees:
in their own countries, if possible.
The Environmental Originsof Refugee Migrations,Maria Garcia points
to Vietnam, where the government is experimenting with different
forms of water, crop, and soil management as an answer to the
2 74
salinization of the Mekong Delta.
The downside of such instruments is that they are hard to enforce
2 75
Soft law
are no repercussions attached to noncompliance.
there
and
without
even
however,
redress;
seeking
for
grounds
legal
no
creates
binding legal force, such instruments have legal value because they
276
demonstrate a commitment to observe their provisions.
Furthermore, while soft law can function to fill gaps in binding

266. McAdam, supranote 192, at 16.
267. Id. at 17.
268. Atapattu Human Rights, supra note 60, at 632.
269. Elizabeth Ferris & Jonas Bergmann, Soft Law, Migration and Climate
Change Governance, 8 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV'T 6, 12 (2017) (recognizing there is a notable
turn toward soft law in developed country commitments in climate migration).
270. See id. at 12 (recognizing there is a notable turn toward soft law in developed
country commitments in climate migration).
271. Atapattu Human Rights, supra note 60, at 632.
272. Id.
273. Swift, supra note 172.
274. Id.
275. Anna Riddell, Human Rights Responsibility of Private Corporations for
Climate Change?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 53, 55-56 (2016).

276.

Id. at 56.
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international law, it may only thrive under passionate and committed
leadership. 2 77 On the other hand, these instruments are flexible and
much easier to adopt than a treaty, in part because they are
nonbinding and therefore more politically palatable. 2 78
The binding and nonbinding law discussed in this Note highlights
the legal vacuum that exists in relation to a vulnerable group of people
displaced by climate change. Currently, these people are falling victim
to global inaction, and there will need to be radical changes of
international law, global strategy, and the players involved in
protecting climate change refugees. The time has come for the global
community to fundamentally shift the question they are asking from
"what can government do?" to "what can any institution do?" 279

IV. PRIVATE CLIMATE-GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES
Among the muddled and complex range of proffered solutions for
climate-induced migration, only one fact remains consistent: public
institutions have repeatedly failed to solve the problem of climate
change refugees for decades. Although rather unorthodox and
unexplored, a small group of progressive environmental scholars have
proposed a new type of institution to address the climate change issues
that slip through the cracks year after year: private climategovernance initiatives .280 Private climate-governance initiatives can
bypass government gridlock in a way that international law cannot
because corporate contracts are not required to respect international
boundaries.2 8 1 This means that while corporations are not subject to
the sometimes-beneficial limitation of an international agreement,
they are able to transcend international boundaries and drive largescale, global change. 282 However, the private governance mechanism
addressed in this Note is not a substitution for binding international
law, but rather a method to protect climate change refugees until a
strategic response becomes possible and to complement government

277. See Ferris & Bergmann, supra note 269, at 13 (stressing the importance of
leadership).
278. See Antto Vihma, Analyzing Soft Law and Hard Law in Climate Change, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 143 (2013).

279. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 226, at 219 ("The emergence of
private governance suggests the need to reconsider the choices typically included in
comparative institutional analysis.").
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A. The ChangingLandscape Allows for Private Governance Initiatives
The rise of large private corporations, nongovernmental
organizations, and other private organizations has created other
institutions capable of acting globally, perhaps even as the dominant
players. 2 84 Dramatic changes in global corporate conduct began to
appear in parallel with alterations in the world trade order resulting
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Not only are private corporations rising up as influential players,
but the evolution of government functions is changing the game itself.
For example, the government does not function in isolation from
markets, but instead collaborates with private institutions to
289
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The international law process confronts a free-rider problem
where all countries will benefit from others' efforts and commitments,
29
but some will bear more costs than others. i As a result, the process
of coming to consensus is likely to result in deep divides between

283. See id. at 303 (showing how private governance can be used when public laws
are unlikely to be adopted or implemented).
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parties.2 92 Within this landscape, scholars recognize the "policy
plasticity" of private initiatives, or the extent to which an organization
can implement the initiatives necessary to achieve climate-related
goals. 293 They recognize that policy plasticity is important because

"time matters," and "the delay caused by political infeasibility will
raise mitigation costs by forty percent per decade." 294
B. Examples of Current Public-PrivateInitiatives
1. Projects Preventing the Displacement of Vulnerable People
Private organizations are already using creative design initiatives
that focus on the complex set of factors causing people to want to
migrate in the first place. After Superstorm Sandy, a program called
"Rebuild by Design" fielded ideas and invested in plans to strengthen
cities against future storms. A group called "Resilience by Design"
explored solutions to protect against slowly rising sea levels, including
a digital tool that pinpoints the communities that are most at risk to
rising sea levels and. drastic weather events. 295
In response to Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rican officials partnered
with Tesla to restore energy to the island through a combination of
solar panels and batteries, thereby bypassing the broken energy-grid
infrastructure. 29 6 This project is an example of action by a private
corporation that can mitigate the effects of climate change and prevent
vulnerable peoples from migrating in the first place. Elon Musk
confirmed in a tweet that Tesla had eleven thousand projects
underway in Puerto Rico as of June 3, 2018.297 Puerto Rico is one of the
biggest examples of Tesla's energy-storage system in a single market,
and Tesla now has plans to collaborate with other governments
interested in a solar-friendly energy future.29 8 In February 2018, the
South Australian government announced a plan to power a network of

292. Id. at 238.
293. Id. at 224.
294. Id.
295. Rob Goodier, The Work Underway Now to Solve Refugee Crises Through
Climate
Change
Action,
ENG'G
FOR
CHANGE
(Nov.
28,
2017),
https://www.engineeringforchange.org/news/creative-action-climate-change/
[https://perma.ccX75U-NXY8] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
297. Mike Brown, Elon Musk Reveals the Staggering Scale of Tesla's Puerto Rico
Solar Projects, INVERSE (June 4, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/45511-teslasolar-elon-musk-reveals-the-staggering-scale-of-puerto-rico-projects
[https://perma.cc/ZKU8-RXA8 ] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
297. Eln Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (June 2, 2018, 11:30 PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1003161 9 6 55 3 3 937667?lang=en [https://perma.cc/
9GQT-ZDG5] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
298. Ellen Guo, South Australia Is Building the World's Largest "Virtual Power
Plant", INVERSE (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/40916-south-australiavirtual-power-plant [https://perma.cc/3F4V-HZZF] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
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2 99
Forming publicfifty thousand homes using Tesla's batteries.
private partnerships like these before a natural disaster strikes could
prevent conditions from deteriorating such that people feel they need
to flee their situation.
Other companies could adopt similar strategies to Tesla and
implement their own technology to reduce the negative effects of
climate change that lead to forced migration. An environmental expert
with One Acre Fund in Uganda recently wrote: "We must . .. address
the reality that rain-fed agriculture alone is no longer viable across the
300
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Horn of Africa due to climate change."
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regions, such as using salt-resistant crops or improved desalination
technology, even if they initially do so at a discount. These companies
might benefit from a more secure license to operate or a sustainable
business relationship with governments. The void in climate changerefugee governance provides an opportunity for private organizations
to leverage emerging technology trends to bring about. a future that
protects those displaced by climate change before they are forced to
migrate.

2. Projects Helping Displaced Peoples
Some may argue that private governance is solely concerned with
the bottom line, but enough people, cities, and corporations may
recognize that a healthy and prosperous society is good for business.
By changing the discourse and recognizing motivational factors, some
private entities have already seen that there are profits and other
benefits in helping climate change refugees. Autodesk has provided
software and services to the settlement team of the UNHCR to design
301
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and build refugee camps faster and better.
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the Horn ofAfrica, DEVEX (May 15, 2017), https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-fightingclimate-change-and-famine-with-forests-in-the-horn-of-africa-90250
[https://perma.cclFT8Y-GBSB] (archived Feb 26, 2019).
301. Id.
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planet, CNBC (June 5, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/05/trump-paris[https://perma.cc/J58R-8V33]
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a carbon neutral future."3 03 They cite Trump's decision to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement as a catalyst for actions by those who want
to mitigate climate change effects.
IKEA is exploring initiatives that include better shelters with
light and power that connect to an electricity grid. 30 4 In November
2016, IKEA opened production centers near refugee camps in Jordan
to provide work to Syrian refugees.30 5 During three periods of time, for
every lamp or bulb sold, IKEA donated one euro to the UNHCR. 30 6
IKEA has received an onslaught of praise in the media for their
initiatives, while simultaneously promoting their image through
statements that condemn a "disconnected" world that overlooks our
base human needs.3 0 7 In a recent Forbes article titled "Can Ikea's
Billions Build a Better Future Than Elon Musk?," a senior writer
praises IKEA for building a better world and promotes their current
projects that center around social co-living, sustainable food, humanfirst interfaces, and new-age making.3 0 8 In their Shared Living lab,
IKEA promotes the message of designing more supportive and
adaptive communities that reimagine the way we design, reuse, and
share space.3 0 9 Through its refugee initiatives, IKEA is building public
trust among itself, consumers, and investors to show that it truly does
care about the human experience of the people that live in IKEAdesigned spaces.
3. Pressure from Shareholders, Investors, and Employees
When private entities are motivated to act, they can harness the
existing support for climate mitigation through various initiatives like
investments and corporate-management decisions.3 10 For example,
303.
304.
U.N.

Id.
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us/news/latest/2015/11/ 5 6 5 cl 6 7 3 6 /ikea-campaign-offers-brighter-future-syrianrefugees.html [https://perma.cc/5TN2-S3T2] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
305. Rachel England, How Ikea helped to change attitudes on helping refugees,
INDEPENDENT (May 28, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politicslikearefugees-help-shelters-attitude-europe-company-middle-east-syria-a7742576. html
[https://perma.cclZ559-XV9U] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
306. Thank You for Helping Us Donate #30 Million To Light Up Refugee Camps,
IKEA FOUND). (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.ikeafoundation.org/pressrelease/ikea-brighterlives-for-refugees-campaign-raises-30-8-million-euros-for-renewable-energy-sources-forrefugee-families/d [https://perma.cc/W4CT-5K9Y] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
307. Kitty Knowles, Can Ikea's Billions Build A Better Future Than Elon Musk?,
FORBES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kittyknowles/2018/03/05/can-ikeasbillions-build-a-better-future-than-elon-musk/#593d5c75271e [https://perma.cc/
K42G-GJXG] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
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309. Shared Living, Better Living?, SPACE1O (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://spacelO.iollabs/shared-living/ [https://perma.cclDZ77-GUTW] (archived Feb. 26,
2019).
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climate-focused activist investors have been putting increased
pressure to respond to climate change on Fortune 500 companies like
Chevron and Kinder Morgan. According to the data group Proxy
Impact, of the more than 420 shareholder resolutions proposed this
year, 20 percent focused on the climate in some capacity. The majority
of these reports focus on climate-related financial risk as it relates to
carbon and methane emissions, but nonetheless they provide a
stepping stone that could one day encompass climate changedisplacement risks. A director at Ceres, a nonprofit that tracks
shareholder engagement, has stated that continued shareholder
311
pressure can lead to actual changes in how a company does business.
Similarly, as social and political values evolve, business partners
of institutions could be impressed by a company's commitment to
environmental initiatives and thus be more likely to engage in
31 2
And not only would corporations
unrelated commitments with them.
be improving their reputation among other business actors, but among
average individuals as well. Whether there has been a recent loss of
faith in public governance or a long-standing historical bias, a recent
US survey found that "more people believe corporations should act on
climate mitigation (roughly seventy percent) than should government
(roughly sixty percent), suggesting a basis for corporations' concern
313
about their climate reputation."
Other motivating pressures that induce corporations to act are
lender pressure, employee morale and recruiting, and other disclosurerelated pressures.3 14 In the carbon-emission context, lenders have
acted individually and in groups to increase the pressures on private
institutions to consider social responsibility among other obligations,
3 15
and the same phenomenon could extend to climate change refugees.
Michael Vandenbergh, a leading scholar in private climate-governance
initiatives, argues for the importance of employee morale and
recruiting, saying that companies who cannot retain employees are at
3 16
Under this rationale, people would be
a competitive disadvantage.
more likely to work for companies if they show their devotion to the
individual rights of climate change refugees and show respect for
personhood. Going even further, it might be possible to motivate more
private institutions to employ climate change refugees in need of work,

311. David S. Rauf, Powerful Investor Push Big Companies to Plan for Climate
Change, SCI. AM. (May 3, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/powerful[https://perma.cc/6MEYinvestors-push-big-companies-to-plan-for-climate-changel
QL6P] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
312. See generally David G. Victor, Taking the Lead: Faced with Government
Inaction, PrivateFirms Emerge as Major Players in Climate Change Mitigation, 358 SCI.
MAG. 1547 (Dec. 2017) (noting that the success of private governance hinges on
behavioral sciences and how the relate to business decisions).
313. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 226, at 248-49.
314. See Vandenbergh, supra note 280.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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following the example that IKEA has set. Such a response would serve
to greatly alleviate the loss of social and cultural resources resulting
from climate-induced migration.
C. PotentialPublic-PrivatePartnershipsfor the Future
1. Infrastructure and the Housing Crisis
Lack of adequate housing is a big problem for those displaced by
climate change.3 17 Incentivizing private institutions to strengthen a
receiving country's capacity to house and integrate climate change
refugees would serve to make a large difference in the plight of the
climate change refugee. For example, IKEA rolled out a "playful
research" project by their Space10 lab called One Shared House 2030
that asks which goods and services-including kitchens, workspaces,
smart devices, childcare, and self-driving cars-people would be
willing to share.3 1 8 The website acknowledges the growing popularity
of shared living.3 1 9 In a similar project, IKEA has launched a project

that provides affordable housing for students called a CPH Village.3.20
A CPH Village involves the creation of a shared living space on unused
land through turning shipping containers into apartments that can be
separated and reassembled. Students are common test subjects when
it comes to affordable and radically unique housing options due to their
flexibility in living arrangements and strong desire for inexpensive
living space. Climate change refugees share many of these
characteristics, however, and could benefit more from such living
arrangements. Space10 aims to establish ten of these student villages
by 2020, totaling 2,500 homes. If even one of these spaces were to be
designated for individuals displaced by climate change, IKEA would
make a meaningful difference in a global humanitarian crisis, while
completing the same observational studies they have planned with the
students.
2. Climate Legacy Registration
The most important way to promote a coordinated privategovernance response to the problem of climate change refugees is to
use reputation as a motive for corporate climate mitigation.3 21
Vandenbergh has recognized that in the context of carbon emissions,
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318. One Shared House 2030: A CollaborativeSurvey Around Co-Living, SPACE10
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://space1o.io/one-shared-house-2030/ [https://perma.cc/M845V8ZN] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
319. Id.
320. CPH Village + SPACE10, SPACE10, https://spacelO.io/cph-village/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2UH5-7YP3] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
321. See Vandenbergh, supra note 280.
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"companies will do back flips to build and protect their reputation, and
many recognize that most of their retail and corporate customers
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As a way to harness these reputational pressures, in Beyond
Politics, Vandenbergh and Jonathan Gilligan propose the idea of a
legacy registration. A legacy registration would contain information
about individuals and organizations that acted in ways worthy of
praise or shame. 323 As Vandenbergh and Gilligan note, "although the
private registry could affect behavior today by making information
publicly available to others in this generation, its greatest effect may
arise from public belief that the information will be stored for many
3 24
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generations and will be easily retrieved in the future."
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Likewise,
climate-related matters.
organizations willing to buy a better reputation, especially when that
326
reputation is guaranteed to live on.

Using legacy as a motivational pressure, private initiatives could
be directed toward projects that require construction and/or
development companies to conduct due diligence on how climate
change could affect the migratory patterns of individuals in the area
they are planning to build on, and actively consider alternatives or
327
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migration planning mechanisms before building.
to the effects
subject
coastlines
on
to
development
particularly relevant
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of rising sea levels. Private standards on any other sort of city planning
mechanisms could be beneficial as well. For example, remembering
climate change refugees in shelter planning and other humanitarian
aid initiatives could make a significant difference in the well-being of
those who migrate due to climate change.
3. Man-Made Island Colonies
Artificial islands already exist in places such as Holland, the
Arabian Islands, Japan, and China.3 28 Numerous scholars have
explored creating artificial floating islands, but the concept has been
repeatedly rejected by the public sector as an unfeasible and drastic
relocation proposal that would be hard to realize due to lack of funds
and political will.32 9 Theo Deutinger, a technologist, has asked the
European Union to adopt his plan for an artificial island in the
Mediterranean Sea offering refuge to African migrants. Deutinger
envisions the European Union securing a lease for the land where the
island's economy would pay back the loan needed to build the island,
but migrant experts have questioned the feasibility of this due to the
high costs and high risks. Other people like Dr. Jeff Crisp from the
Refugee Studies Center question the implications of such a project,
saying, "even if you could demonstrate that technically it's possible,
you'd have to move onto the political, legal and financial aspects of
it. a3o
Private- governance
models
could
incentivize
private
organizations to invest in such projects in ways the public sphere
cannot. Participating organizations would likely receive heavy media
attention, increasing their reputations and promoting their brand
names. It could also serve as a marketing strategy for any relevant
technology that would be used in the project. Such a project could also
be framed as an investment, with certain rights being allocated to
participating organizations, such as property rights.
According to a California startup called the Seasteading Institute,
the world's first privately-owned floating island may be established by
2020. Seasteading is the concept of creating permanent, floating
dwellings at sea. On January 13, 2017, the Seasteading Institute
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the French Polynesian
government to create a floating city off the coast of Tahiti, setting aside

328. Vijayalaxmi Kinhal, The Largest Artificial Islands in the World, WORLD
ATLAS (last updated July 19, 2018), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-largestartificial-islands-in-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/34ZT-VL4M] (archived Feb. 26,
2019).
329. Kelman, supra note 53, at 136.
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Technologist, ENG'G & TECH. (Dec. 7, 2017), https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/
201 7 /1 2 /build-artificial-island-in-med-as-home-for-refugees-says-dutch-technologist/
[https://perma.cc/QH2T-5SKS] (archived Feb. 26, 2019).
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33
25 percent of the living spaces for Polynesian citizens. ' The project
website advertises multiple housing options, including one with
"mutually beneficial relationships with the local community and our
33 2
Proposed architectural plans
growing network of supporters."
include eco-friendly technology such as wind-powered and solarpowered devices, sustainable "aquaculture" systems, and desalination
procedures. The company plans to manage the future islands, but
wants them to run under their own governance models and use their
own cryptocurrency called Varyon. The institute, initially financed by
Peter Thiel, sees floating islands as a way to solve "lack of start-up
innovation in governance," and as a way to support libertarian ideals.
While the political aspects of such a project may result in hesitancy to
promote these artificial islands, countries could leverage their
bargaining power to place substantial contractual limitations on the
role of private companies like the Seasteading Institute. And as
seasteading increases in quantity and feasibility, states may find
themselves with more bargaining power to request full islands for their
citizens displaced by climate change, or they might prefer to allow a
free-government system, depending on the desires of the people they
represent. SIDS might be in a particular position of bargaining power
due to the rich marine environment of the area. Such options could
align with the vision of Joe Quirk, the president of the Seasteading
Institute, who has stated that he wanted to see "thousands" of rogue
floating cities by 2050, each of them "offering different ways of
governance."3 33 The Seasteading Institute website specifically
to
addresses sea level rise, saying the institute is working on designs
33 4
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Critics of the floating islands worry it could be "an apartheid of
the worst kind" that caters to wealthy people who want to set
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exacerbate such an apartheid. Furthermore, the environmental
impacts of these private floating islands remain unknown. While they
do not require the invasive sand-dredging techniques that other
artificial islands do, they would still shade the seabed and may result
in adverse effects for the coral reef or sea grass environments. In the
alternative, the cities may provide research potential in using the
ocean for sustainable food and energy production, while
simultaneously giving refuge to individuals displaced by climate
change.
While these are only a few examples of how private initiatives can
help solve public issues, they are a promising place to start because
they are feasible in the near future even absent strong government
action, and they have the ability to bring about meaningful change.
Private-governance initiatives are important due to the current state
of urgency surrounding climate change refugees and government
resistance to major action. It is not a problem we can keep pushing off
until tomorrow. Because it is unlikely that the international
community will effectuate meaningful legal change after decades of
gridlock, private governance is a second-best method of protecting a
vulnerable class of people.

V. CONCLUSION

Climate change migration poses unprecedented challenges in
international law. People have been displaced by climate for millennia,
but humans are now at a particular historical moment where they face
a new type of climate-driven migration that will be fast and intense.
These changing circumstances will require incredible adaptability to
keep up with the changes that are forecast to happen. Privategovernance initiatives can bypass gridlock and national boundaries to
provide effective instruments that can be implemented immediately.
While a binding law solution would be ideal, it has proven unattainable
and we are about to miss the chance to buy time until lawmakers open
their eyes to the gravity of the climate change-refugee issue and
respond with meaningful protection. Until lawmakers can fill the gaps
in international law to protect vulnerable people displaced by climate
change, private organizations have the resources, global reach, and
self-interest to build a better world.
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